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DFSNZ v XYZ presents a worrying precedent for anti-doping law. That case arose after New 
Zealand's anti-doping enforcement body, Drug Free Sport New Zealand (DFSNZ), expanded its 
jurisdiction over recreational athletes. It did so by internal administrative decision and without notice. 
This action was upheld in DFSNZ v XYZ by a majority of the Sports Tribunal resulting in an 
unsuspecting recreational golfer being banned for one year. The decision upheld DFSNZ's extension 
of onerous obligations and invasive testing powers designed for elite athletes to the large proportion 
of ordinary New Zealanders who partake in recreational sport. This article critiques the XYZ 
decision on two bases: (a) DFSNZ's illegitimate expansion of its jurisdiction to recreational athletes 
by mere administrative policy change; and (b) the pitfalls of extending a regime designed for elite 
athletes to recreational athletes. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has developed a new World 
Anti-Doping Code which will come into force in January 2021. The 2021 Code creates a new two-
tiered system which treats "athletes" and "recreational athletes" differently. This article analyses the 
new Code and critiques its shortcomings with regards to defining the Code's jurisdiction and ensuring 
a proportionate response to doping in recreational sport. WADA's new code is a step in the right 
direction but fails to go far enough to align with the participation, health and education objectives of 
recreational sport. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Sport is an integral part of New Zealand's culture. In 2017, 73 per cent of adults reported that they 
had participated in sport or active recreation in the last seven days.1 Sport enhances physical, mental 
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and social wellbeing, eases stress and builds thriving communities.2 However, many sporting New 
Zealanders would be shocked to learn that they might be subject to a "potentially vast regime" that 
exposes them to the same onerous liability – sanctioning and testing for drugs – as elite athletes.3 
When XYZ, an anonymous recreational sportsperson, ordered clenbuterol online in late 2014, he 
would have had no idea of the implications of his purchase. The drug clenbuterol assists in burning 
fat without compromising lean muscle mass; XYZ purchased it to deal with his excess weight. After 
the supplier of the drug was discovered in an investigation, XYZ's name was matched to a database 
of registered sports club members. He was shocked to have to front up to the Sports Tribunal, unaware 
that he had the same obligations as an elite athlete such as an Olympian or an All Black. 
The ongoing series of proceedings in relation to clenbuterol has thrown the jurisdictional issues 
of anti-doping law into stark relief. Drug Free Sport New Zealand (DFSNZ) administers and enforces 
anti-doping law. Although this article places its focus on the "test case" of DFSNZ v XYZ (XYZ),4 the 
implications of DFSNZ's overreach into the lives of ordinary sportspeople are widespread. 
The XYZ decision gives DFSNZ invasive powers over recreational athletes. Regular weekend 
competitors are legally subject to drug testing at any time and any place, including their own home.5 
Tests are for the prohibited list of substances which includes prescription medication and cannabis.6 
An adverse finding could mean a lengthy ban from all sport. The lack of testing of recreational athletes 
means impositions of bans are rare. However, such invasive powers conferred on an unelected 
organisation without notice to affected sportspeople should give one pause.  
This article begins by exploring two issues illustrated by XYZ. First, the jurisdiction asserted by 
DFSNZ is worrying in its scope, its implications for human rights and inconsistency with the rule of 
law. Second, the failure to differentiate between elite and recreational athletes raises concerns about 
the proportionality of the regime. 
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) conducted a review of the current World Anti-Doping 
Code (the Code), which culminated in the new 2021 Code which comes into force in January 2021. 
The 2021 Code creates a new two-tiered system which treats "athletes" and "recreational athletes" 
differently. This article additionally canvasses the 2021 Code and critiques its shortcomings with 
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regards to delineating jurisdiction and ensuring a proportionate response to doping in recreational 
sport. 
II NEW ZEALAND'S SPORT ANTI-DOPING ARRANGEMENTS 
The law that governs sports doping in New Zealand is a product of international instruments and 
agreements. After the world woke up to the reality of doping in sport through the 1980s and 1990s, 
states organised to create a unified response to the problem.7 
The first World Conference on Doping in Sport was held in 1999, leading to the establishment of 
the WADA. WADA administers a set of rules, the Code, which must be adopted and implemented by 
signatories. The Code is prescriptive, with a long list of prohibited substances, and is one of strict 
liability, which bites regardless of fault. The rationale underlying the strict liability principle is to 
protect the clean athlete by creating a level playing field to uphold the integrity of sport.8 
New Zealand has ratified the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) International Convention against Doping in Sport which directs countries to implement 
the Code.9 The Code is given effect to in domestic law through the Sports Anti-Doping Act 2006. 
This sets up DFSNZ, an independent Crown Entity, which translates the Code into domestic rules 
called the New Zealand Sports Anti-Doping Rules (the Rules). DFSNZ is New Zealand's National 
Anti-Doping Organisation (NADO). 
To ensure consistency, all the operative offence and definition provisions in the Code are 
"mandatory in substance",10 so they cannot be substantively changed when implementing the Code 
into domestic rules.11 The Sports Anti-Doping Act also sets up the Sports Tribunal which hears doping 
cases and interprets the Rules.12 NZ Rugby has its own tribunal (the NZ Rugby Judicial Committee) 
to administer the Rules. 
The scope and application of anti-doping rules to recreational athletes have recently become a 
concern. Traditionally, exclusively elite-level and national-level athletes received sanctions, as only 
the highest echelons of competition were subject to testing. In recent years, anti-doping enforcement 
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56 (2020) 51 VUWLR 
bodies have entered into "intelligence" investigations in addition to testing athletes during 
competition.13 These investigations go after the suppliers and importers of banned substances, and 
often involve surveillance and raids. Though effective, this has had the consequence of revealing 
violations by low-level "recreational" athletes. 
In 2016, Medsafe conducted a background criminal investigation in relation to Medicines Act 
1981 offending by a Christchurch man selling the anabolic steroid clenbuterol. Medsafe is a 
government body that administers medicine legislation and regulation.14 The investigation produced 
email "snapshots" of online clenbuterol purchases in 2014–2015 which were then passed on to 
DFSNZ. After matching up purchase information with DFSNZ's records, proceedings were issued 
against a number of elite-level, national-level and lower-level sportspeople. XYZ was the Sport 
Tribunal's 11th clenbuterol case as a result of the Medsafe investigation and a test case for DFSNZ's 
jurisdiction.15 
III THE DFSNZ V XYZ DECISION 
A Facts 
The anonymous respondent, XYZ, was identified in the Medsafe investigation. He purchased 
clenbuterol and another drug to offset its side-effects, dianabol.16 Purchases were made between 
November 2014 and January 2015.17 Both clenbuterol and dianabol are prohibited substances, banned 
at all times.18 Proceedings against XYZ were initiated by DFSNZ in 2018 alleging violations of rr 2.2 
(use) and 2.6 (possession) of the Rules. 
XYZ was in common parlance a "recreational" athlete. He admitted to the alleged violation but 
said he did not take clenbuterol to aid his performance, but rather to lose weight.19 His evidence was 
that he was significantly overweight, in the range of 130 to 140 kilograms.20 The respondent was not 
an "elite" sportsperson. Initially, he claimed that he was only a member of Surf Life Saving New 
Zealand by signing up his children and making a donation. He asserted his participation was merely 
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14  Michael Wright "'Smart but dumb': Inside New Zealand's biggest sports steroids ring" (19 May 2018) Stuff 
<www.stuff.co.nz>. 
15  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [1]. 
16  At [3]. 
17  At [3]. 
18  Sports Anti-Doping Rules, rr 2.2 and 2.6. 
19  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [5]. 
20  At [5]. 
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social, not ever involving competition.21 It subsequently emerged however that in October 2015 he 
had participated in a surf lifesaving event at the national level, around 10 months after he purchased 
the clenbuterol. It further emerged that XYZ was also a member of a golf club and, therefore, by virtue 
of the club's affiliation to New Zealand Golf, he was subject to the Rules. He admitted to competing 
regularly in club and inter-club events, but these events never reaching a national level.22 
B Sports Anti-Doping Rules 2018: Relevant Rules 
The Rules apply to "National Sporting Organisations" such as Surf Life Saving New Zealand and 
New Zealand Golf which have agreed to be bound.23 Members of clubs under those organisations are 
also bound.24 The respondent was subject to the Rules by virtue of membership of his local clubs who 
are affiliated with their parent organisations, Surf Life Saving New Zealand and New Zealand Golf 
respectively.25 However, just being subject to the Rules does not create liability for using or 
possessing prohibited substances such as clenbuterol and dianabol. That liability only extends to those 
defined as an "athlete".26 
"Athlete" is defined in the Rules: 
Athlete: Any Person who competes in sport at the international level (as defined by each International 
Federation) or the national level (as defined by each National Anti-Doping Organisation). An Anti-Doping 
Organisation has discretion to apply anti-doping rules to an Athlete who is neither an International-Level 
Athlete nor a National-Level Athlete, and thus to bring them within the definition of "Athlete." In relation 
to Athletes who are neither International-Level nor National-Level Athletes, an Anti-Doping Organisation 
may elect to: conduct limited Testing or no Testing at all; analyse Samples for less than the full menu of 
Prohibited Substances; require limited or no whereabouts information; or not require advance TUEs. 
However, if a Rule 2.1, 2.3 or 2.5 anti-doping rule violation is committed by any Athlete over whom an 
Anti-Doping Organisation has authority who competes below the international or national level, then the 
Consequences set forth in the Code (except Article 14.3.2) must be applied. For purposes of Rule 2.8 and 
Rule 2.9 and for purposes of anti-doping information and education, any Person who participates in sport 
under the authority of any Signatory, government, or other sports organisation accepting the Code is an 
Athlete.  
  
21  At [5]. 
22  At [11]. 
23  Rule 1.1.3. 
24  Rule 1.1.4. 
25  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [31]. 
26  Sports Anti-Doping Rules, rr 2.2 and 2.6. 
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The definition is poorly drafted and is more clearly represented by the diagram below (see Figure 1). 
The definition has a mandatory "elite" core that cannot be changed. It requires that National Anti-
Doping Organisations (NADOs) have international-level and national-level sportspeople within their 
domestic definitions of "athlete". In addition to this mandatory core, the definition provides that 
NADOs have the "discretion" to extend the definition to lower-level sportspeople who are below the 
international or national level. 
Figure 1: Components of the definition of "athlete" in the current WADA Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C Summary of the Sport Tribunal's Decision 
The main issue for the Tribunal to decide was whether XYZ fell within the definition of "athlete". 
The Rules provide DFSNZ the "discretion" to extend the definition of "athlete" to lower-level 
sportspeople like XYZ. The question therefore was how must DFSNZ exercise this discretion? Was 
it required to do so by positive amendment to the Rules, or was it sufficient to do so by ad hoc 
administrative decision? Ultimately, the Tribunal held that the Code contemplated DFSNZ being able 
to expand the definition of "athlete" through administrative decision.27 
The Tribunal rejected DFSNZ's submission that XYZ was brought within the definition of 
"athlete" simply by virtue of his membership to Surf Life Saving New Zealand. Although this was 
obiter, the Tribunal was not persuaded that membership alone without active participation in a 
competitive event would be sufficient for the definition of "athlete" to apply.28 Therefore, the 
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respondent was within the definition of "athlete" by competing in swimming and golf at a recreational 
or club level at a time when he was in possession of and using the prohibited drugs.29 
There was also an issue of whether the Rules allowed for prosecutorial discretion or whether the 
Rules mandated DFSNZ to bring proceedings when it saw evidence of doping by recreational 
sportspeople. DFSNZ claimed it lacked discretion: if it found an athlete in violation of the Rules, it 
had no option but to issue proceedings.30 The Tribunal found this submission unusual and at odds 
with the proportionate approach to prosecutions that is normally seen in New Zealand jurisprudence.31 
The Tribunal issued a separate decision to decide the sanction appropriate for XYZ in this case.32 
The mandatory starting point for the period of ineligibility was two years, given that the contravention 
was not intentional.33 There was the question of whether the respondent could establish "no significant 
fault or negligence" which, if proven, would allow the Tribunal to reduce the two year period of 
ineligibility to a shorter period, though not less than one year.34 The test for this reduction in sanction 
was found in the case of DFSNZ v Mills.35 It was said that:36 
An athlete's level of fault is assessed against what a reasonable person acting in accordance with the strict 
obligations under [the Rules] ought to have done to avoid breaching the Rules, considering the perceived 
level of risk.  
Counsel for XYZ argued that, as the respondent had no indication he would be bound by the Rules, it 
would be unlikely he would have researched into whether the drugs were prohibited.37 DFSNZ instead 
said the starting point was that the respondent was bound by the Rules.38 The Tribunal accepted 
DFSNZ's starting point and, from that position, could not find XYZ exercised appropriate care. The 
respondent had not made any attempt to discharge his obligations under the Rules to check to see if 
this substance was prohibited.39 
  
29  At [59]. 
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31  At [47]. 
32  DFSNZ v XYZ (Sanction), above n 4. 
33  Sports Anti-Doping Rules, r 10.2.2. 
34  Sports Anti-Doping Rules, r 10.5. 
35  Drug Free Sport New Zealand v Mills ST06/17, 8 November 2017. 
36  At [27]. 
37  At [9]. 
38  DFSNZ v XYZ (Sanction), above n 4, at [10]. 
39  At [16]. 
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Given that finding, the starting point for a sanction was two years ineligibility. Both parties agreed 
that XYZ was entitled to six months credit for the delays in the prosecution and hearing process.40 
However, there was disagreement over whether he could be credited for a timely admission.41 The 
respondent argued that the admission was made immediately after he was charged when he "accepted 
the imposition of a sanction".42 DFSNZ conversely contended that, although the respondent admitted 
to using and possessing the drugs, he did not admit to violating the Rules. This was because he had 
advanced a legal argument that he was not bound by the Rules.43 The Tribunal rejected this argument 
and highlighted the fact that there was an important and controversial jurisdictional issue that had to 
be determined.44 To penalise the respondent for appearing with counsel to assist the Tribunal in this 
legal task would have been "unconscionable in all the circumstances".45 
The respondent was successful in arguing that the period of ineligibility should run from the date 
of the provisional suspension order, 3 October 2018.46 Therefore the Tribunal imposed a two year 
ineligibility period, but allowed reductions for delay (six months) and timely admission (six months) 
to arrive at a one year ineligibility period.47 
The Tribunal constantly expressed its discomfort in reaching its conclusion throughout the 
decision. In a lengthy postscript, the panel members stressed that their decision would likely be met 
with shock and surprise by the wider sporting community.48 DFSNZ's broad powers to apply anti-
doping rules to recreational sportspeople was described as a "potentially vast regime" with 
implications that necessitated public debate.49 The Tribunal reluctantly accepted DFSNZ's 
interpretation of its jurisdiction and expressed frustration over its powerlessness in assessing 
recreational athletes' culpability in a "common sense and proportionate way".50 
  
40  Sports Anti-Doping Rules, r 10.11.1; and DFSNZ v XYZ (Sanction), above n 4, at [17]. 
41  Sports Anti-Doping Rules, r 10.11.2; and DFSNZ v XYZ (Sanction), above n 4, at [18]. 
42  DFSNZ v XYZ (Sanction), above n 4, at [18]. 
43  At [18]. 
44  At [18]. 
45  At [19]. 
46  Sports Anti-Doping Rules, r 10.11.3; and DFSNZ v XYZ (Sanction), above n 4, at [22]. 
47  At [23]. 
48  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [69]. 
49  At [70]. 
50  At [70]. 
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Curiously, DFSNZ is pursuing an appeal of the Tribunal's decision to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS).51 Details of the appeal are confidential, but it appears that DFSNZ is looking to appeal 
the level of sanction imposed by the Tribunal. This requires the case to be heard afresh by an 
international arbitrator and represents a large undertaking by DFSNZ which is sure to consume 
valuable investigatory resources. 
IV DRUG FREE SPORT NEW ZEALAND'S VAST JURISDICTION 
The XYZ decision represents a worrying precedent for New Zealand sports jurisprudence. A large 
proportion of New Zealanders participate in sport each year and now are under DFSNZ's jurisdiction 
as "athletes".52 The intrusive nature of DFSNZ's powers over "athletes" warrants a sense of alarm. 
Athletes are subject to unannounced testing for a wide range of prohibited substances. These 
prohibited substances include recreational drugs such as cannabis, and medicine prescribed by 
doctors. Many casual sportspeople would be unaware they are subject to the same invasive regime 
that applies to the elite athletes they see competing on TV. This incursion into regular sportspeople's 
liberty and human rights was not done after clear consultation and amendment, but rather by an 
unannounced "administrative fiat".53 This ultimate result is that DFSNZ, an unaccountable executive 
body, now possesses wide coercive powers over a sizeable proportion of the population. This is 
exacerbated by the Rules giving little weight to culpability, instead imposing automatic sanctions. 
There are three broad issues with DFSNZ's jurisdiction over recreational athletes. Firstly, the 
definition of "athlete" was expanded relying on ambiguous language and in an incorrect manner. 
Second, the assertion that membership of a sports club alone is enough to bind an individual to the 
Rules is particularly troubling for the scope of DFSNZ's jurisdiction. Third, the claim of no 
"prosecutorial discretion" for recreational athletes, coupled with a strict liability scheme, does not 
accord with a common sense approach to prosecutions found in New Zealand. 
A The Expansion of the Definition of "Athlete" 
The first issue regarding jurisdiction is the scope and manner in which the definition of "athlete" 
was expanded from elite athletes to included recreational athletes. 
1 Submissions and the Tribunal's decision 
The Tribunal identified that the area of inquiry was whether the respondent was an "athlete" at the 
time of his drug purchases. At this time, XYZ was competing at a sub-national level. The issue was 
whether DFSNZ had effectively exercised its "discretion to apply anti-doping rules to an Athlete who 
  
51  Dana Johannsen "Drug Free Sport NZ to appeal Athlete XYZ ruling to the Court of Arbitration for Sport" (3 
April 2019) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
52  Brocklesby, above n 1. 
53  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [57]. 
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is neither an International-Level Athlete nor a National-Level Athlete, and thus to bring them within 
the definition of 'Athlete'".54 
Importantly, the definition provision is simply copied verbatim from the WADA Code and placed 
into the domestic Rules. DFSNZ's position was that it exercised its discretion to expand the application 
of the Rules to lower-level athletes. It had done this by the making of the Rules themselves and the 
inclusion of the Code definition of "athlete" without amendment.55 
The majority of the Tribunal (Chairman Sir Bruce Robertson and Alan Galbraith QC) held that 
DFSNZ did have the discretion to take steps to expand the Rules by administrative policy change to 
include recreational athletes within the drug possession and use prohibitions.56 This decision was a 
reluctant one, with the panel admitting in their postscript that their finding will have implications that 
an unwitting public may be "dismayed" to learn of.57 
The majority held that simply applying the definition to XYZ, without a rule change, was a valid 
exercise of DFSNZ's discretion to expand the definition of "athlete".58 To support this finding, 
reference was given to the precedent of other countries that had done the same (other than the United 
Kingdom and Ireland). They stressed that a formal, positive amendment would have been 
preferable.59 
The minority panel member was Dr Jim Farmer QC who sided with the respondent's 
submissions.60 Counsel for XYZ contended that the only valid way to extend the definition was by 
amendment.61 Simply copying the WADA definition unchanged into the domestic Rules was not 
sufficient to have exercised that discretion. The discretion was not in the definition, exercised at the 
whim of DFSNZ by ad hoc prosecution of recreational athletes like XYZ. What this means is that the 
Code gives a rule-making discretion to NADOs to create a provision that specifies whether the lower-
level sportspeople are to be considered "athletes". The definition contains options for how NADOs 
can do so: whether to conduct testing, a full analysis of samples, require whereabouts information or 
  
54  At [35]. 
55  At [36]. 
56  At [58]. 
57  At [69]. 
58  At [58]. 
59  At [56]. 
60  At [57]. 
61  At [36]. 
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require advance "therapeutic use" exemptions.62 This is the approach taken in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, though not followed in any other jurisdiction.63 
The implication of this approach is that the current definition was limited to its "elite core" and 
thus could only capture international-level and national-level athletes. Any extension without 
amendment would be held as void. On the facts, XYZ was not competing at an elite level at time of 
possession and use of the prohibited substances. He was merely competing at a recreational level in 
golf and swimming.  
Ultimately, by majority, the Tribunal held that DFSNZ was entitled to extend the definition of 
"athlete" to recreational athletes by administrative decision. The respondent had competed in sports 
(swimming and golf) at a recreational level at the time when he was in possession and using the 
prohibited drugs. 
2 Critique 
The majority likely felt that their hands were tied to decide in favour of DFSNZ. To do otherwise 
would be to take an approach contrary to every other jurisdiction. Countries like Canada have simply 
copied in the Code definition and treated it as giving the NADO the discretion to change the rules at 
any time by administrative decision.64 The Tribunal likely recognised that the power of the WADA 
Code is its consistency and universality across jurisdictions. In the face of all but two countries 
(Ireland and the United Kingdom) treating the Code definition as merely contemplating an 
administrative decision to expand the definition, they were cautious to adopt an interpretation that 
was out of step with the rest of the world. 
However, it is the author's view that there was sufficient textual ambiguity and that, in light of the 
empowering Act's purpose and the human rights implications of DFSNZ's interpretation, this 
ambiguity should have been resolved to require a positive amendment. 
The Tribunal stated that the Rules should be interpreted strictly and, where there is ambiguity or 
uncertainty, be construed in favour of the athlete.65 This is consistent with international precedent 
which has held that imposing strict liability for doping on athletes must be done with clear rules.66 
  
62  See Sports Anti-Doping Rules definition of "athlete". 
63  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [23]. 
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1 definition of "athlete". 
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been endorsed many times by Court of Arbitration for Sport panels over the ensuing years. 
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The purposes of the empowering legislation are also instructive to an interpretation exercise.67 
The purpose contained in s 3 of the Sports Anti-Doping Act is "protecting athletes' fundamental right 
to participate in doping-free sport and in this way promote health, fairness, and equality for athletes 
worldwide". Evidently, fairness and health are important rationales for New Zealand in implementing 
the Code which should colour any textual interpretation. 
Including a person within the definition of "athlete" heavily impinges on their liberties by 
imposing on them the strict regime designed for elite athletes. Athletes can be required to give 
whereabouts information regarding their location and be subject to medical testing.  
The Code's definition envisages a NADO having the discretion to implement an extended regime 
to sportspeople below the national level. The majority's approach essentially holds that DFSNZ can 
exercise this discretion to develop an extended regime by simply restating the broad Code definition 
in the domestic rules. This then entitles them to exercise that discretion at any time, to the fullest 
extent allowed by the Code, by initiating proceedings against a recreational athlete. In other words, 
by copying the definition straight from the Code, DFSNZ can confer upon themselves the future 
option to expand the Rules via administrative policy. 
This interpretation of the Code does not accord with New Zealand's jurisprudence regarding the 
constraint of executive power. Nothing within the Code allows a discretion within the Rules to expand 
the definition. The discretion is instead within the Code; the discretion is DFSNZ's task of translating 
the broad Code definition into domestic Rules. In other words, it is a rule-making discretion. Such a 
task requires amendment to the Rules, a process that allows major stakeholders a reasonable 
opportunity to comment on proposed changes.68 
Requiring a positive amendment accords with the fundamental principle of the rule of law. 
Counsel for the respondent argued along "natural justice" lines that, because the discretion was 
exercised by administrative fiat, lower-level competitors like XYZ had no say nor any idea they were 
now bound by the Rules as "athletes".69 DFSNZ rightly invoked the principle that "ignorance of the 
law is no defence" and the Tribunal considered the issue to be one of interpretation, rather than natural 
justice.70 However, it is a fundamental principle that our law should be certain and predictable to 
allow citizens to plan their affairs.71 Where possible, the courts have and should "read down" powers 
  
67  Interpretation Act 1999, s 5. 
68  Sports Anti-Doping Act, s 16(4). 
69  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [42] and [44]. 
70  At [23]. 
71  Joseph Raz "The Rule of Law and its Virtue" (1977) 93 LQR 195 at 196. 
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in order to preserve rights and freedoms.72 Allowing DFSNZ to decide in this case to extend the 
definition to XYZ by policy decision means the wider public do not know whether they are covered. 
Executive decisions that may substantially affect rights should not be done by administrative action, 
but rather by actual rule change. 
A correct process of exercising the discretion is found in an overseas example referred to 
throughout the judgment. The United Kingdom extended its definition to lower-level athletes through 
a positive amendment. Its definition is "… an Athlete is any Person who participates at any level in 
any sport under the authority of any Signatory, government or other sports organisation accepting the 
Code".73 
B The Claim That Mere Membership Suffices to Be an "Athlete" 
1 Submissions and the Tribunal's decision 
DFSNZ asserted its widest possible jurisdiction by arguing that it could bring people into the 
definition of "athlete" simply by virtue of their club membership. The basis for this argument was that 
DFSNZ had amended r 1.1.5.2.74 That rule governs which "persons" the Rules are applicable to, 
though it does not govern which of those "persons" are considered "athletes". The rule was amended 
to include anyone who is a member of any national sporting organisation, club, team, association or 
league.75 DFSNZ contended that by its expansive amendment of r 1.1.5.2, and by having the definition 
of "athlete" left as it was in the Code, it had the ability to bring persons into the definition by virtue 
of their membership to a club without needing to prove they had any participation in sporting 
activities.76 
The respondent disagreed and argued that while such membership binds club members to the 
Rules by r 1.1.5.2, it does not follow that by amending that rule the definition of "athlete" can then 
include the ability to prosecute those lower level participants.77 Amending that rule would widen the 
effect of the complicity provisions. This refers to offences of assisting, aiding and abetting of athletes 
by coaches or other club members. This would mean that a person who did not compete in sport at 
  
72  JF Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003) at 219–227; and R v Pora 
[2001] 2 NZLR 37 (CA) at [50]–[51]. 
73  Sports Anti-Doping Rules 2015 (UK), definition of "athlete". 
74  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [16]. 
75  Rule 1.1.5.2. 
76  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [16]. 
77  At [39]. 
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any level would be subject to the Rules by virtue of club membership, but not subject to the provisions 
for testing or breach of the anti-doping prohibitions that only apply to athletes.78 
The Tribunal found DFSNZ's argument unattractive, characterising it as an "unsatisfactory feature 
of the case".79 DFSNZ pursued the respondent on the basis of his membership, irrespective of whether 
he actually competed in sporting events.80 The anti-doping body continued this line of argument even 
after it transpired that XYZ had competed in competitive (but wholly recreational) events in his local 
golf club.  
The Tribunal rejected DFSNZ's assertion with reference to the text of the definition. The definition 
of "athlete" has an appended comment which refers to the possibility of including "individuals who 
engage in fitness activities but do not compete at all".81 The Tribunal stressed that the comment was 
merely an interpretative aid and not a part of the definition.82 The underlying purpose of the definition 
was to cover persons who participated in sport. This was clear from first line of the "athlete" definition: 
"any person who competes in sport".83 The definition was meant to capture true competitors not those 
who are merely members of a club.84 The Tribunal considered the dividing line to be "active 
participation in a competitive event".85 On the facts, this requirement was satisfied as the respondent 
had actively partaken in club and inter-club level competitions while consuming the prohibited drug. 
Therefore, the Tribunal's rejection of DFSNZ's position is obiter. 
2 Critique 
The Tribunal rightly rejected DFSNZ's assertion that people who are merely members of clubs 
can be considered "athletes". In its postscript the panel was clear that if DFSNZ's view was accepted, 
people who were members for purely social or dining reasons would be considered "athletes" which 
was clearly outside the purview of the Code.86 
The Tribunal ought to have had further reference to the purposes of the Code when rejecting 
DFSNZ's argument. International precedent is clear that rules must be interpreted in a purposive 
  
78  At [38]. 
79  At [6]. 
80  At [6]. 
81  At [53]. 
82  At [53]. 
83  Emphasis added. 
84  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [53]. 
85  At [52]. 
86  At [70]. 
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manner which "seeks to discern the intention of the rule-maker, and not to frustrate it".87 The Code 
has its purpose grounded in protecting the clean athlete and applying the harsh regime to people who 
are merely members does not in any way further that purpose. Imposing bans on social members of 
the many sports clubs around New Zealand fails to protect clean athletes as those social members 
never compete in any events. 
The UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport also provides a strong basis for rejecting 
DFSNZ's argument.88 As a signatory, the Convention contains New Zealand's international anti-
doping obligations. The convention contains its own definition of athlete: "'Athlete' means … any 
additional person who participates in a sport or event at a lower level".89 Anti-doping efforts were 
thus not intended to be directed at those who never participate in sporting events. 
C The Claim of No Prosecutorial Discretion for Recreational Athletes 
The third issue regarding jurisdiction is DFSNZ's claim that it has no prosecutorial discretion and 
thus it is obliged to bring proceedings against recreational athletes when it has evidence of prohibited 
drug use. 
1 DFSNZ's argument 
The justification advanced by DFSNZ for its lack of prosecutorial discretion was that the anti-
doping regime required automatic sanctions for it to be observed.90 DFSNZ felt it could not be seen 
to be making decisions whether to prosecute athletes or not as this would insert an element of leniency 
into the Code that unscrupulous countries may abuse.91 
The Tribunal found this approach incongruent with a "sensible, principled assessment of all the 
circumstances" that is "at the heart of all New Zealand jurisprudence".92 As the proceedings against 
XYZ were brought before the Tribunal, they had no option but to consider his liability. 
  
87  See AC v Fédération Interationale de Natation Amateur CAS96/149, 13 March 1997 at [22], relied on in 
Lv Fédération Internationale des Luttes Associées CAS2000/A/312, 22 October 2001 at [23]. 
88  International Convention against Doping in Sport, above n 9. 
89  Article 2 (emphasis added). 
90  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [46]. 
91  See the well-documented state-sanctioned doping by Russia and China. 
92  DFSNZ v XYZ (Liability), above n 3, at [47]. 
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2 Why is there prosecutorial discretion for recreational athletes? 
DFSNZ's argument is not one to be dismissed lightly. The existence of a harmonised set of global 
rules has been the basis for successful anti-doping efforts.93 It is clear there should not be prosecutorial 
discretion for elite athletes (national-level and international-level) that could be abused by 
unscrupulous countries. Following from that rationale, DFSNZ's position is that it has no prosecutorial 
discretion for all "athletes", including recreational athletes like XYZ.  
There is a robust argument that prosecutorial discretion is available for recreational athletes. 
Recreational athletes are part of the discretionary extension of the definition of "athlete". Given that 
NADOs can use their discretion to extend the definition of "athlete" to lower-level sportspeople, it 
follows that they can also use their discretion when deciding whether or not to prosecute those lower-
level sportspeople. 
Such an approach is preferable for a few reasons. The position does not harm the international 
consistency of the rules as they apply to elite athletes. It also ensures that the limited resources of 
enforcement agencies are not being wasted chasing recreational athletes that, on any objective view 
of the circumstances, have no need to be prosecuted. It also recognises that it is often not in the public 
interest to prosecute someone where there would be disproportionate punishment. It enables NADOs 
to take into account individual circumstances for rules that, on their face, would apply the same to all 
recreational athletes. 
3 Relevance of the Solicitor-General's prosecution guidelines 
The Solicitor-General provides prosecution guidelines which require an evidential and public 
interest test before proceedings are issued.94 The public interest test includes factors such as the 
seriousness of the offence, the availability of proper alternatives to prosecution and the need for 
deterrence.95 
These guidelines apply to government agencies and Crown entities.96 DFSNZ is an independent 
Crown entity.97 However, whether DFSNZ's enforcement of anti-doping rules is considered within 
the criminal law (and thus subject to prosecution guidelines) is disputed. 
  
93  SH Backhouse and others Study on Doping Prevention: A map of Legal, Regulatory and Prevention Practice 
Provisions in EU 28 (European Union, 12 December 2014) at 29. 
94  Crown Law Office Solicitor-General's Prosecution Guidelines (1 July 2013) at 6. 
95  At 8–9. 
96  Law Commission Criminal Prosecution (NZLC R66, 2000) at 16. 
97  Sports Anti-Doping Act, s 7. 
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The first anti-doping rules came from the Olympics and were firmly contractual in nature.98 
Competitors could participate if they agreed not to take performance-enhancing substances. Doping 
regulation grew in the context of modern sport and modern doping advancements. A recent legal 
opinion commissioned by WADA concluded that the Code was civil in nature in an European Union 
context.99 However, it is arguable that the contractual model of anti-doping law is unsustainable in 
the context of sanctioning recreational sport,100 an activity a sizeable proportion of the population 
partakes in. The Code shares many features of the criminal law, from the wording of offences to 
sentencing. A layperson reading the language employed by the Tribunal in XYZ would reasonably 
conclude that the criminal law was at play. 
If the guidelines were to apply, a reasonable prosecutor would have likely concluded that it was 
not in the public interest to pursue XYZ. The offence was not serious as he was merely competing at 
a social level where clenbuterol would have a negligible impact on his performance. Imposing a period 
of ineligibility from all sport is counterproductive to educating and meeting the health goals of a 
person seeking to lose weight. Prosecution would not provide adequate deterrence to recreational 
athletes at large who likely do not realise their obligations. 
V THE ISSUE OF PROPORTIONALITY: RULES FOR ELITE 
ATHLETES BEING APPLIED TO RECREATIONAL 
ATHLETES 
A Examining the Rationale for the Code 
The Code has the clearly stated purposes of protecting athletes' fundamental right to participate in 
doping-free fair competition and ensuring harmonised and effective anti-doping measures at national 
and international level.101 The Code prescribes which substances are banned and rests on the principle 
of strict liability; if a prohibited substance is found to be present, a ban is automatically imposed. Why 
is this approach considered desirable for elite athletes? 
The strict liability principle exists to uphold the clean athlete's right to participate in doping-free 
competition. By imposing automatic bans, athletes who take prohibited substances are not advantaged 
over clean athletes, whether they intended to dope or not. Furthermore, automatic bans regardless of 
fault remove the possibility for certain sporting countries to use any leniency within the Code to favour 
their athletes. The corollary of a strict liability regime is that it puts the onus on the athlete and their 
  
98  Drug Free Sport New Zealand "A history of doping in sport and the anti-doping movement in New Zealand", 
above n 7. 
99  Jean-Paul Costa Legal opinion regarding the draft 3.0 revision of the World Anti-doping Code" (World Anti-
Doping Agency, 1 June 2013) at [4]. 
100  See Alan Sullivan "The World Anti-Doping Code and Contract Law" in Ulrich Haas and Deborah Healey 
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entourage to ensure that prohibited substances do not enter the athlete's system. Elite athletes possess 
the knowledge, resources and support systems to navigate their obligations which results in the strict 
liability rule creating a strong deterrent to doping. 
B Why the Code's Rationale Does Not Extend to Recreational Athletes 
The strict liability principle at the heart of the Code is not appropriate for athletes outside the elite 
arena. The key rationale of ensuring a level playing field does not feature as strongly in recreational 
sport. Low-level competitors do not compete primarily for honours or victory but rather for personal 
achievement, health benefits and collegiality. Furthermore, doping in the recreational arena often 
provides little benefit to the athlete with playing conditions, teammates, technique and skill all being 
bigger factors than artificial enhancements like hormone levels or increased oxygen intake. 
As opposed to elite competitors, recreational athletes lack knowledge and support about how to 
meet their strict obligations of the Code.102 Recreational athletes do not have access to expert advice 
regarding the extensive list of banned substances. Further, recreational athletes lack adequate 
education from NADOs. This means that imposing a strict liability regime is counterproductive to 
cleaning up sport as a lack of awareness undermines deterrence. The UNESCO Convention recognises 
that education must be cast wider than the net of liability. The Convention's definition of "athlete" 
makes the term as wide as "any person who participates in sport" for the purposes of anti-doping 
education and training programmes.103 Creating liability wider than education does not result in 
improvements in deterrence or health outcomes for recreational athletes.  
There are real harms in imposing ineligibility sanctions on recreational athletes. The Tribunal in 
XYZ acknowledged the stigma of the "cheat" label that is applied to those who violate the Rules.104 
There is a real risk of job prospects being lost as a result.105 Furthermore, recreational sport and elite 
have different objectives. It is trite to state that sports participation leads to increased physical health 
and fosters a sense of community. To take that away from a recreational athlete due to what was, in 
all probability, an inadvertent and harmless violation does more harm than good. 
Moreover, the lack of flexibility in sanctions is disproportionate when applied to lower-level sport. 
Intentional doping carries a four year ineligibility period106 and unintentional doping carries a two 
  
102  Backhouse and others, above n 93. 
103  International Convention against Doping in Sport, above n 9, art 2(4). 
104  DFSNZ v XYZ (Sanction), above n 4, at [13]. 
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year ineligibility period.107 By establishing "no significant fault or negligence" an athlete can receive 
a minimum of one year ineligibility.108 A period of ineligibility must be imposed; no reprimand is 
available. All of the sanctions and consequences set down in the Rules apply to recreational athletes 
in the same way as they apply to an Olympian. The Tribunal characterised this lack of flexibility 
"difficult to rationalise" for low levels of athletic participation.109 In light of recreational athletes' lack 
of awareness about their obligations, a tribunal's inability to respond to actual culpability does not 
accord with common sense. 
Doping in recreational sport is a growing and pressing issue.110 However, a punitive approach is 
an ineffective solution. Recreational athletes who dope are not rational actors who respond to the 
deterrence of a strict liability regime. Instead, doping is justified irrationally through "moral 
disengagement" from the consequences of doping.111 Body image, peer pressure and supplement 
culture are all major drivers which are best dealt by an education and health-based approach.112 
The Code should have a separate approach that meets the specific needs of each group. Applying 
the same regime that was designed for elite athletes to lower-level participants is inappropriate and 
counterproductive. The preceding analysis relating to the health, participation and proportionality 
objectives of recreational sport ought to colour and guide any proposed amendment to the Code. 
VI A NEW WAY FORWARD? THE 2021 CODE REVIEW 
The Code's approach to recreational athletes is not fit for purpose. This is internationally 
recognised, with many countries feeling uneasy about imposing the same level of sanctions and 
liability on weekend sportspeople as on elite competitors.113 WADA sought to address this issue in 
their periodic Code review. On 16 November 2017, WADA initiated the 2021 Code Review Process, 
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embarking on a two-year, three-phase stakeholder consultation. This culminated in a new 2021 Code 
which comes into force in January 2021. 
A Introducing a "Recreational Athlete" Category 
1 Introduction 
WADA took a new path from previous Code iterations and recommended a new two-tiered 
approach. This retains the regular category of "athlete" and introduces a new category of "recreational 
athlete". 
Comments from stakeholders in response to a discussion document expressed concerns over the 
current sanctioning regime applying to recreational athletes.114 Submitters framed their comments 
around the issue of proportionality and fairness in treating recreational athletes the same as elite 
athletes.115 The disproportionality concerns stemmed from recreational athletes having very little 
knowledge of their stringent obligations and from the way the current Code hinders countries from 
achieving health objectives for recreational sports. Anti-Doping Denmark stressed that it tests lower-
level athletes purely for public health reasons, and not necessarily to create a level playing field.116 
The Code in its current state runs against that objective by mandating that the full sanctioning regime 
applies to recreational athletes. Furthermore, submitters wanted a more flexible sanctioning regime 
for recreational athletes that included rehabilitation, education and probation, rather than pushing 
social competitors away from sport by imposing a period of ineligibility.117 
Interestingly, DFSNZ submitted in favour of reforming the Code's treatment of recreational 
athletes.118 Although taking a tough line in its submissions to the Sports Tribunal in XYZ, its 
submission to WADA was far more lenient to recreational athletes. It had concerns over the rise of 
anti-doping investigations, like Medsafe's clenbuterol investigation that caught XYZ, which expose 
greater numbers of lower-level athletes to liability who are not traditionally tested. DFSNZ submitted 
that "[i]mposing the full force of the Code in such situations may lead to sub-optimal outcomes."119 
It also advocated for an optional formal warning for recreational athletes possibly combined with 
mandatory anti-doping education.120 
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In light of those stakeholder comments, the 2021 Code Review introduced a new category: 
"recreational athlete".121 The final iteration of the 2021 Code is analysed and critiqued. 
2 Increased sanctioning discretion 
Essentially, a "recreational athlete" will be subject to a different sanctioning regime from an 
"athlete". If a "recreational athlete" can establish "no significant fault or negligence", then they can 
access a lower band of sanctions. A tribunal can give a reprimand and no period of ineligibility, or, at 
a maximum, two years ineligibility.122 
Therefore, the new provision allows tribunals to give essentially a discharge without conviction. 
The onus is on the "recreational athlete" to establish "no significant fault or negligence". Once that is 
established, it is still up to the judicial body to assess the degree of fault in deciding whether to grant 
a mere reprimand or up to two years ineligibility. 
In addition to added sanctioning flexibility, there is a starting point of no public disclosure for 
violations by "recreational athletes". Article 14.3.7 provides that mandatory public disclosure is not 
required, and any optional disclosure should be proportionate to the facts and circumstances of the 
case. This recognises public disclosure has detrimental and disproportionate effects on recreational 
athletes' job prospects. 
3 The definition of "recreational athlete" 
Which individuals are able to receive this new sanctioning discretion? The new category of 
"recreational athlete" is defined as follows:123 
Recreational Athlete: A natural Person who is so defined by the relevant National Anti-Doping 
Organization; provided, however, the term shall not include any Person who, within the five years prior 
to committing any anti-doping rule violation, has been an International-Level Athlete (as defined by each 
International Federation consistent with the International Standard for Testing and Investigations) or 
National-Level Athlete (as defined by each National Anti-Doping Organization consistent with the 
International Standard for Testing and Investigations), has represented any country in an International 
Event in an open category or has been included within any Registered Testing Pool or other whereabouts 
information pool maintained by any International Federation or National Anti-Doping Organization. 
WADA has left it to NADOs, such as DFSNZ, to decide their own definition subject to three 
limitations. These limitations are that within the previous five years the individual has not: 
• been an international-level or national-level "athlete"; 
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122  World Anti-Doping Agency Code 2021 [WADA Code 2021], art 10.6.1.3. 
123  WADA Code 2021, definition of "recreational athlete". 
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• represented any country in an international event; or 
• has been included in a registered testing pool or whereabouts information pool by any 
international federation or NADO. 
The flexibility of this definition allows NADOs to determine an appropriate formulation that suits 
their own resource constraints, sporting structures and appetite for enforcement.124 
The diagram below highlights how the new category fits into the existing Code. NADOs can still 
extend the definition of "athlete" to individuals below the "elite" level. However, they have the ability 
to provide sanctions on recreational sportspeople in a more proportionate manner by defining them as 
a "recreational athlete". 
Figure 2: Components of the definition of "athlete" in the new 2021 WADA Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B Evaluating the Changes 
1 Proportionality 
The new 2021 Code does well in recognising the disproportionality of applying the current regime 
to recreational athletes. Tribunals now have greater power to assess actual culpability by being able 
  
124  World Anti-Doping Agency 2021 Code Revision: Second Draft (Following the First Consultation Phase) – 
Summary of Major Proposed Changes Found in the First Draft of the Code (December 2018) at [13]. 
 THE OVER-PROSECUTION OF RECREATIONAL ATHLETES IN LIGHT OF DFSNZ V XYZ 75 
to award a reprimand if "no significant fault or negligence" is established. "Recreational athletes" 
benefit from the same flexibility in sanctioning as minors. This recognises the similarities between 
the two groups: a lack of education and low-stakes competition means that imposing the full force of 
the Code is counterproductive to the objectives of health and participation.125 However, the changes 
in the 2021 Code do not go far enough. 
Firstly, the new sanctioning flexibility applies only when "no significant fault or negligence" is 
established. If this cannot be established, then the "athlete" is still subject to the same sanctions as 
elite athletes: a minimum sanction of two years for unintentional violations,126 and four years for 
intentional violations.127 Arguably, this will result in recreational athletes being over sanctioned. 
Tribunals may interpret "no significant fault or negligence" as requiring a high level of care that 
recreational athletes will not exercise. In XYZ, the Tribunal found that XYZ's actions were not in 
accordance with what a "reasonable person acting in accordance with the strict obligations under … 
[the Rules] ought to have done" as he failed to inform himself whether his purchases involved a 
prohibited substance.128 Arguably this test is too stringent on recreational athletes who may not be 
aware of their liability or how to assess whether a certain product is compliant. Such a high bar will 
undermine the accessibility of the lower sanctioning band. 
Furthermore, recreational athletes who intentionally or negligently take prohibited substances will 
be subject to the full force of the Code. These substances may have little performance enhancing 
benefits at lower levels of competition (like clenbuterol for XYZ). Those who intentionally violate 
the Code are better off to have shorter bans and be referred to education and rehabilitation than lengthy 
bans that have little effect in protecting the clean athlete in social sport settings. 
A further issue is that the sanctioning regime does not give countries leeway to impose different 
consequences that are not foreseen by the Code. Many submitters, including DFSNZ, advocated for 
a power to require novel consequences such as rehabilitation programmes or mandatory anti-doping 
education.129 Such a power would better give effect to the health and education rationales of the Code. 
Finally, the three limitations in the "recreational athlete" definition operate for too long a time 
period. Five years is a considerable period of time for retired "elite" athletes to have the full 
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consequences of "athlete" imposed on them when they engage in recreational sport.130 Furthermore, 
the limitation of an international event could capture the growing number of recreational international 
events, like the World Masters Games. 
2 Jurisdiction/operation of the Code 
The new 2021 Code does little to recognise the jurisdictional issues illustrated by the XYZ 
decision. 
How NADOs are to exercise their discretion has not been addressed. The definition of "athlete" 
still gives NADOs discretion to expand the full sanctioning regime to lower-level sportspeople. The 
issue of how a NADO can exercise this discretion, either through positive amendment or merely 
through ad hoc administrative policy, is left unresolved. In Part IV, the case was made for requiring a 
positive amendment as this accords better with constraining executive power and upholding the rule 
of law. The Code should make it clear that NADOs are required to exercise a rule-making discretion. 
This should apply to the discretionary extension of "athlete" and to whatever formulation of 
"recreational athlete" is decided on. Countries retain their sovereignty to extend the definition of 
athlete, but this should not be done "by stealth" without a rule change. 
The Code also fails to clarify whether NADOs can formulate their definition of "recreational 
athlete" so wide as to capture individuals who are members of clubs but do not participate in sport. It 
is questionable whether WADA's sports anti-doping mandate could ever be used to justify regulating 
the lives of club members who do not compete at all. Individuals who are club members for social 
purposes should not face possible sanctions for possession of recreational drugs or the "wrong" 
medication by a body originally conceived to regulate elite sport.  
C A Preferred Approach 
It is important to draw together the threads of the preceding analysis in light of the XYZ case and 
the WADA 2021 Code review. This preferred approach urges WADA to go further in acknowledging 
the differences between elite and recreational athletes. 
Recreational athletes should have further sanctioning leniency. A narrower sanction band should 
be available when "no significant fault or negligence" is established of zero to one year ineligibility. 
For negligent violations the band should be one to two years; for intentional doping it should be two 
to four years. Ideally, these lower bands should be supplemented by sanctioning factors that reflect 
the unique position of recreational athletes. This should guide tribunals' sanctioning decisions within 
the range available. Such factors would include the stigma of a sanction, effect on job prospects, 
deterrence value, degree of fault, degree of performance enhancement and benefit of continued sport 
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participation on the individual's physical and mental wellbeing. Further, NADOs should be able to 
impose novel consequences such as mandatory education programmes. 
Furthermore, the Code should clarify that "no significant fault or negligence" ought to be a 
different test for recreational athletes. Such a legal test should be a capacity-based objective test which 
recognises the lower ability of recreational athletes to meet their Code obligations. There should be a 
presumption that recreational athletes satisfy the "no significant fault or negligence" test, and the onus 
on NADOs to prove otherwise. 
The limitations on the "recreational athlete" definition should also be changed. The limitations 
should be reduced from five years to two years to alleviate the unfairness on retired athletes. The 
limitation of being a competitor in an international event should also be removed as this is too broad. 
To mitigate concerns that this shorter timeframe would be abused by injured or up-and-coming 
athletes, the Code could allow NADOs to retroactively elevate to full sanctions if the guilty 
"recreational athlete" goes on to elite competition within two years of the violation. 
The operation of the Code should be clarified to ensure NADOs cannot assert a broad jurisdiction 
by simple administrative policy change. The Code should clarify that the definitions of "athlete" and 
"recreational athlete" contemplate a rule-making decision. A clear limitation on jurisdiction is also 
needed to ensure NADOs cannot extend their enforcement regime to club members who do not 
actively participate in sport.  
VII CONCLUSION 
Doping in both elite and recreational sport is widespread and is a serious problem. However, the 
case of XYZ has shown the pitfalls of extending by administrative fiat a regime designed for elite 
athletes to regular recreational athletes. The current law results in the imposition of disproportionate 
sanctions on unaware recreational athletes which does little to advance the participation, health and 
education objectives of lower-level sport. 
The new WADA 2021 Code comes into force in January 2021. It is to be commended for 
recognising the special position of recreational athletes. However, it does not go far enough to 
remediate the proportionality issues of the current Code. Furthermore, the review fails to address the 
troubling manner in which jurisdiction has been asserted by anti-doping agencies like DFSNZ. 
Participation in sport is an integral part of New Zealand society and contributes to an individual's 
physical, mental and community wellbeing. WADA should go further that its current 2021 Code to 
create an anti-doping regime that properly supports and enhances recreational sport. 
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